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I. INTRODUCTION
In passing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA or the Act) Congress attempted to further two goals: creating a
uniform scienter requirement for private securities litigation and
bringing about a reduction in the filing of frivolous securities lawsuits.
A controversial circuit split over the meaning of the PSLRA’s scienter
requirement has prevented the Act from achieving either of its goals.
Congressional intent to minimize abusive securities litigation practices
is clear in both the Act’s legislative history and the probable effect of its
main provisions (the “core provisions”). The core provisions have the
clear purpose and the ability to reduce the filing of frivolous lawsuits by
reducing plaintiff’s1 bargaining leverage. The PSLRA could have furthered
the stated congressional goal of discouraging the filing of meritless securities
lawsuits by reducing the attractiveness of bringing private securities
claims. However, the courts and commentators have mostly interpreted
the PSLRA’s ambiguous scienter provision in a manner that undermines
the dominant purpose of the Act.
In this Comment, “bargaining leverage” refers to a party’s ability to
gain an advantageous settlement. The more bargaining leverage a party has,
the better are the chances it will receive a favorable settlement. Thus, a
plaintiff with superior bargaining power will presumably be able to attain
a larger settlement. Conversely, a defendant with superior bargaining power
will have the increased chances of arriving at a smaller settlement or
avoiding settlement altogether. Numerous factors can influence a party’s
bargaining leverage. For example, plaintiff’s bargaining leverage in a
negligence action will improve significantly if she discovers that the
1. In the interest of simplicity, this article commonly refers to the parties of a
class or derivative action as simply “plaintiff.”
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defendant was intoxicated while operating a vehicle that collided with
the plaintiff’s car. Other types of information can also have substantial
impact on the parties’ respective bargaining positions, including changes
in the applicable law, extra-legal ramifications,2 and the amount of
resources necessary to pursue litigation. This Comment depends
largely on the assumption that there will be some positive correlation
between the strength of a party’s bargaining leverage and the quality
of settlement she will be able to attain.
This Comment advocates a purposivist reading of the scienter
requirement in private securities litigation. Section II.A of this comment
provides an overview of securities litigation and the relevant laws,
including the PSLRA. Section II.B illustrates how the core provisions of
the PSLRA advantage defendants by comparing the core provisions of
the Act to the law as it stood before the PSLRA and to other alternatives
available to Congress. Section II.C describes the importance of purposivism
in interpreting securities laws. Section II.C concludes that any reading
of the ambiguous scienter requirement that favors securities litigation
plaintiffs is inconsistent with the crux of the Act and the policy of
federal securities laws. Section III.A describes the pre-PSLRA circuit
split, whereas section III.B describes the post-PSLRA circuit split and
describes why the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of scienter is the sole
interpretation that is consistent with the crux of Act. Section IV
concludes with a recommendation that the United States Supreme Court
grant certiorari and adopt the Ninth Circuit’s articulated scienter
requirement should the issue present itself for appellate review.
II. THE CORE PROVISIONS OF THE PSLRA PLACE THE PLAINTIFF IN A
DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION
A. History
1. Overview of Securities Litigation
There are two distinct classes of securities litigation, public securities
litigation and private securities litigation.3 Public securities litigation
2. Extra-legal ramifications for a corporation include injury to brand image that
might result from litigation. In considering whether to settle or litigate, a corporation
must weigh both the costs of settlement and potential brand injury against expected
results at trial.
3. For a discussion of the history of the definition of “security” see Marc I.
Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of “Security”:
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comprises those suits prosecuted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice. Private securities
litigation comprises those suits brought by investors. The SEC is the
government agency responsible for regulating the sale of securities in
both initial offerings and subsequent transactions.4 Due to limited
resources, the SEC is unable to investigate and ultimately prosecute
every possible case of fraud.5 Private securities litigation is a means to
The “Context” Clause, “Investment Contract” Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND.
L. REV. 489, 493–98 (1987); Theresa A. Gabaldon, A Sense of a Security: An Empirical
Study, 25 J. CORP. L. 307, 309–10 & nn.14–15 (2000). See also William J. Carney,
Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Contextual Approach to
Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311, 356 (1984) (arguing that the subject
matter of one-on-one transactions should not be classified as a security because the
Securities Acts’ disclosure requirements are only applicable to instruments whose
valuation is affected by economies of scale).
4. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has the responsibility of
administering and enforcing the federal securities laws. . . . The Commission
enforces the federal securities laws by conducting investigations in large part
through its regional and branch offices which may lead to criminal
prosecutions, civil actions for injunctive relief, or to administrative
proceedings to impose remedial sanctions on broker-dealers and investment
advisers and to issue cease and desist orders.
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 1:1 (2003) [hereinafter
SECURITIES HANDBOOK]. The SEC’s regulatory and enforcement roles are supplemented
by several other types of organizations. See id. at §§ 1:2–1:8. Self-regulatory
organizations, including the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers,
posses self-regulatory responsibilities. Id. at § 1:2.
The rules of such self-regulatory authorities must provide for the disciplining
of their members, and persons associated with their members, for violations of
the rules of the exchange, and for violations of the Exchange Act and rules
adopted thereunder. Such rules must provide a fair procedure for determining
violations and imposing sanctions.
Id. The Comptroller of the Currency for national banks, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulate banks
to the extent to which they are subject to securities laws. Id. at § 1:3. These regulatory
bodies typically require the filing of periodic reports exhibiting compliance with
securities laws. Id. Each of the fifty-three districts has some form of securities
regulation laws, dating back to Kansas’ enactment of the Blue Sky laws in 1911. Id. at
§ 1:5. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation protects investors against the risks
associated with their broker-dealers becoming insolvent. Id. at § 1:7. The Public
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, makes it
illegal for any public accounting firm that is not registered with PCAOB to participate in
part of the securities issuance process. Id. at § 1:8.
5. The SEC enforcement division employs only 935 individuals to prosecute
fraudulent transactions. See 2003 SEC ANN. REP. 15, available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/annrep03.shtml (last visited May 7, 2005). This small group of professionals is
charged with enforcing rules violations on two of the world’s largest exchanges. The
New York Stock Exchange sees in excess of $11,000,000,000,000 in transactions per
fiscal year and the NASDAQ lists securities from well over 4000 companies. Nell
Ingals & Laura Johnson, Stocks and How They are Traded, at http://www.sls.
lib.il.us/reference/workshop/business/stocks.html (Nov. 18, 2002). It is clear that the
SEC alone does not create a sufficient threat of prosecution to act as an effective
deterrent.
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supplement the SEC’s limited enforcement resources, which the SEC
advocates.6
Proponents of private securities litigation note that it is a valuable tool,
essential to furthering the goal of directorial accountability.7 Private
securities litigation offers a means for shareholders and their lawyers to
monitor the behaviors of a corporate board in the interest of reducing
agency costs.8 These justifications of private security litigation have done
little to dispel the negative stereotypes associated with the attorneys who
represent securities plaintiffs.9
Opponents of private securities litigation argue that excessive private
securities litigation places unfair burdens on corporations, the typical
defendants in private securities litigation.10 These burdens include the
cost of defending against frequent prosecution and monitoring costs.
Insuring against fraud by managers and employees imposes substantial
agency costs on corporations.11
6. Frank v. Cooper Indus., SEC Litigation Release No. 14356, 58 SEC Docket 807,
807 (Dec. 15, 1994) (“The [SEC] has consistently stressed the importance of . . . private
rights of action . . . .”).
Private securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded
investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon government
action. Such private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our
capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate
officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
7. JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 904 (5th ed. 2003) (“[S]hareholder lawsuits constitute a very important . . . corporate
accountability mechanism because they alone target specific instances of managerial
misconduct and can be initiated without collective action by a corporation’s shareholders.”).
8. Id. at 904–10.
9. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 1007 (1996) (“The bar,
as a whole, has an image today of the securities plaintiffs’ lawyer as both overzealous
and self-regarding.”).
10. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (implying that the state of private
securities litigation prior to the passage of the PSLRA did not live up to the “high
standard[s]” to which it should aspire). The commentary further notes “significant
evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits” and thus a need “to enact reforms to
protect investors and maintain confidence in our capital markets.” Id. These abusive
practices included “the targeting of deep pocket defendants . . . [and] the abuse of the
discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often [economically rational]
for the [corporation] to settle.” Id.
11. See R EINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL ., T HE A NATOMY OF C ORPORATE L AW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 21–31 (2004) (discussing the three most
prominent agency costs in the corporate setting, including the innate conflict between
shareholders and managers, and further discussing the most effective strategies for
limiting agency costs).
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Private securities litigation accounts for a substantial portion of
securities litigation, as rational self-interested individuals pursue suits
against corporations or boards of directors when they feel they have
been the victims of fraud.12 One result of allowing securities fraud suits
to be brought by private parties is an environment where committing
securities fraud is less attractive, as private party litigation greatly
increases the number of individuals who have an incentive to bring suit.
Thus, private securities litigation serves an important deterrent function
by increasing the chances that corporate defendants will be subject to
civil suit for engaging in fraudulent activities.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and the rules
promulgated thereunder are among the laws under which the SEC
operates. The Exchange Act was adopted during the Great Depression
to “promote investor confidence in the United States securities markets
and thereby to encourage the investment necessary for capital formation,
economic growth, and job creation.”13 The Exchange Act protects investors
from manipulated stock prices and imposes reporting requirements on
publicly traded corporations.14

12. The SEC brings a relatively limited number of actions per year. For example,
the SEC brought 271 and 270 civil injunctive actions in fiscal year 2003 and 2002,
respectively. 2003 SEC ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 17. In these same years the SEC
brought 365 and 281 additional administrative actions. Id. It should be noted that these
numbers refer to prosecutions against both natural and artificial entities. It is very
common for a single case of fraud to result in filing of actions against multiple
individuals. See, e.g., SEC v. Morris Weissman, SEC Litigation Release No. 17068, 75
SEC Docket 1288, 1288–1293 (July 18, 2001). This litigation release shows that several
civil actions arose from a single fraudulent scheme: Civil Action No. 01 CV 6449 (JSR)
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001); SEC v. Am. Banknote Corp., Civil Action No. 01 CV 6450
(JSR) (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001); SEC v. Am. Bank Note Holographics, Inc., Civil Action
No. 01 CV 6453 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001); SEC v. Richard Macchiarulo, Civil
Action No. 01 CV 6454 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001); SEC v. Anotonio Accornero
and Russell McGrane, Civil Action No. 01 CV 6452 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2001); In
the Matter of Am. Bank Note Holographics, Inc.; In the Matter of Mark Goldberg, CPA;
In the Matter of John Lerlo. Id. In addition, the SEC brought three administrative
proceedings in regard to the same fraudulent scheme: Administrative Proceeding File
Nos. 3-10532, 3-10534, and 3-10533. Id.
13. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683
(1995); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730
(“The overriding purpose of our Nation’s securities laws is to protect investors and to
maintain confidence in the securities markets, so that our national savings, capital
formation and investment may grow for the benefit of all Americans.”).
14. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearings on
S. 414 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Finance and Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 48, 52 (1983) (statement of John Shad, Chairman, SEC) (noting that the primary
purpose of forced corporate disclosure is the protection of investors, not the prevention
of bribery).
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Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it illegal to “employ . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. . . .”15 Subsequently,
the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act. Rule 10b-5 provides that securities fraud occurs when it can be
proven that the defendant (1) made a misstatement or omission,16 (2) of a
material fact,17 (3) with scienter,18 (4) on which the plaintiff justifiably
relied,19 (5) that proximately caused plaintiff’s injury.20 The courts have
found that Congress implicitly provided for a private cause of action
under section 10(b) when passing the Exchange Act.21 Plaintiffs bringing
this private cause of action must prove the same five elements as their
government counterparts.
A plaintiff bringing a securities action is required to include particular
factual allegations because the heightened pleading standard of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 9(b)22 applies to securities fraud
claims.23 To state a claim under the default federal pleading system of
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Supp. 2000).
16. In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999).
17. Id.
18. Id. This is the most controversial element of a 10b-5 cause of action. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004) (defining scienter as “[a] degree of
knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act
or omission; the fact of an act’s being done knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil
damages . . . . A mental state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”).
19. Comshare, 183 F.3d at 548. For an analysis of the role of reliance in securities
litigations, see Gregory S. Meece, Class Actions, Typicality, and Rule 10B-5: Will the
Typical Representative Please Stand Up?, 36 EMORY L.J. 649, 660–61 (1987).
20. Comshare, 183 F.3d at 548.
21.
While other sections of the Securities Exchange Act, in proscribing
the practices described therein, specifically make a civil cause of action available,
§ 10 does not expressly provide for a civil remedy. The question to be
discussed at this point is whether, notwithstanding the absence in § 10 of a
specific provision for a civil cause of action, such a cause of action exists in
favor of a private person.
While the question has never been decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States, the lower federal courts have unanimously held that a civil
cause of action may be brought by a private person to enforce §10 (b) of the
Securities Exchange Act . . . .
37 A.L.R. 2d 649, 650 (1954). The article goes on to state that courts unanimously
rejected the expressio unius est exclusio alterius argument in favor of not making a
private cause of action available. Id. at 651–52.
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (addressing pleading special matters).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”). Securities fraud claims
constitute a substantial portion of private securities litigation, as the business judgment
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notice pleading imposed by FRCP 8(a), the pleader need only state “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”24 Under notice pleading, motions for summary judgment rarely
succeed, as the pleader can easily state a claim under the permissive
standard.25 Heightened pleading standards, which require that a claim be
plead “with particularity,” are in opposition to the otherwise liberal
federal system of notice pleading.26 The application of a heightened
pleading standard presents a challenge to the plaintiff and substantially
reduces her bargaining leverage.27
rule protects directors from liability for most business decisions. The business judgment
rule is a rebuttable presumption that protects disinterested corporate decisions made on
an informed basis and in good faith, provided they are made in the corporation’s best
interest. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 212 (8th ed. 2004). If not for the business judgment
rule, private securities litigation would increase dramatically, because shareholders
would be able to sue the corporation for poor business decisions. The exception to the
business judgment rule is that it is not applicable to decisions where a director is guilty
of self-dealing to the detriment of the corporation.
The “business judgment rule”, however, yields to the rule of undivided
loyalty. . . . The dealings of a director with the corporation for which he is the
fiduciary are therefore viewed “with jealousy by the courts.” . . . Such personal
transactions of directors with their corporations, such transactions as may tend
to produce a conflict between self-interest and fiduciary obligation, are, when
challenged, examined with the most scrupulous care, and if there is any
evidence of improvidence or oppression, any indication of unfairness or undue
advantage, the transactions will be voided.
Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6–7 (1944).
24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (addressing general rules of pleading).
25. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding that a
complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “however inartistically [it] may be stated”
provided plaintiff shows that defendant has done some legally correctable harm to
plaintiff). The implicit holding of Dioguardi is that courts will be extremely reluctant to
dismiss actions on motions to dismiss absent a glaring factual or procedural deficiency.
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298
F.3d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 2002). (“[A]n inevitable tension arises between the customary
latitude granted the plaintiff on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and
the heightened pleading standard set forth under the PSLRA.”). Heightened pleading
standards are only allowed as provided for under FRCP 9(b) or where otherwise
authorized by statute and cannot be created absent explicit authorization. See
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 164 (1993) (representing the holding of the United States Supreme Court that a
federal court was not entitled to apply a heightened pleading standard to a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights action alleging municipal liability). This holding was in response to
municipal assertions that municipalities were entitled to qualified immunity based on the
good faith actions of their officers.
27. A heightened pleading standard increases the probability that a defendant will
win at summary judgment. This increased ability to dismiss cases at the summary judgment
stage was the motivating factor behind courts implementing heightened pleading
standards for disfavored lawsuits. For example, courts have attempted to interject
heightened pleading standards for § 1983 actions against public officials. Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (reasoning that legislative history and public
policy weigh against the imposition of qualified immunity for acts done in good faith
under color of law). Defendants have a very difficult time prevailing on motions for
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One difficulty associated with heightened pleading standards is that
they often require a plaintiff to plead facts that he may not yet possess.
As one commentator astutely observed, “[y]ou can’t get discovery unless
you have strong evidence of fraud, and you can’t get strong evidence of
fraud without discovery.”28 The PSLRA’s stay provision29 worsens this
conflict by delaying discovery until after the complaint survives a
motion to dismiss.
2. Legislative History of the PSLRA
On December 22, 1995, Congress enacted the PSLRA over President
Clinton’s veto.30 One commentator described the PSLRA as “the most
momentous event in the history of securities regulation since the
adoption of the [Securities Act and the Exchange Act].”31 The PSLRA
introduced major revisions to the Exchange Act and the rules of private
securities litigation. Among the most significant changes were the
incorporation of a safe harbor provision,32 replacement of joint and
summary judgment absent a heightened pleading standard. See Dioguardi, 139 F.2d at
775.
28. Charles F. Hart, Interpreting the Heightened Pleading of the Scienter
Requirement in Private Securities Fraud Litigation: The Tenth Circuit Takes the Middle
Ground, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 577, 577 (2003) (quoting Columbia University law
professor Jack Coffee).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2004).
30. SECURITIES HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 1:15; See Michael B. Dunn, Note,
Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, a Textualist
Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 220 (1998) (discussing the varied responses to
President Clinton’s veto, including the House of Representatives override of the veto
with minimal discussion of heightened pleading standards and a thorough response from
the Senate). Senators Arlen Specter, Republican from Pennsylvania and the author of
the unsuccessful Specter Amendment to the PSLRA, and Paul Sarbanes, Democrat from
Maryland and coauthor of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supported the presidential veto and
argued that dropping the Specter Amendment would result in a new pleading standard
which was higher than the prevailing Second Circuit standard. Id. Other Senators
disagreed with the position of Senators Specter and Sarbanes and President Clinton, and
argued that the law would not result in a heightening of the Second Circuit pleading
standard. Id.
31. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL ET AL., PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM
ACT: SPECIAL UPDATE, 1–2 (1996) [hereinafter PSLRA UPDATE].
32. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.9[8] (4th ed.
2002). Forward looking statements are projections or statements relating to anticipated
future performance. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS,
591–92 (4th ed. 2004). The PSLRA’s safe harbor protects a qualified person from liability
in private action where the statements are accompanied by “meaningful cautionary”
language, or where plaintiff cannot adequately establish that the statements were made
“with actual knowledge.” Id. at 591.
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several liability with comparative liability for most defendants,33 and the
creation of a cap on damages.34
Congress’s stated aim in passing the PSLRA was to discourage the
filing of unnecessary securities fraud claims, including the following:
(1) the practice of filing lawsuits in response to a significant drop in
price without evidence of fraud,35 (2) targeting of financially resourceful
defendants,36 (3) use of excessive discovery to encourage settlement,37
and (4) the manipulation of plaintiffs by class action attorneys.38 The
Conference Committee stated that it was their intent to strengthen the
pre-Reform Act pleading standard, and not to codify the prevailing
Second Circuit standard.39 Advocates of the Second Circuit standard
largely dismiss this statement.40
The Ninth Circuit relied on express statements of congressional intent
when the court read the legislative history of the PSLRA to mean that
Congress intended to “raise the standard above all existing requirements.”41
President Clinton stated that his reason for vetoing the bill was his
disapproval of any attempt to heighten the standard beyond that applied
in the Second Circuit, which then applied the highest pleading standard.42
Commentators have heavily criticized President Clinton’s objections
based on subsequent statements by the proponents of the bill that
expressed their disagreement with the President’s reading of its impact.43
3. Enter Stage Right: The PSLRA
The PSLRA represents an attempt by Congress to strike the optimal
balance between protecting investors from fraud and preventing
33. Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act)
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 52 (1998).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2004).
35. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 41 (“Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing
pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit’s case law
interpreting this pleading standard.”).
40. See, e.g., Laura R. Smith, The Battle Between Plain Meaning and Legislative
History: Which Will Decide the Standard for Pleading Scienter After the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 603–04 (1999)
(discussing the flaw in the logic used in Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp, 954 F. Supp. 1246,
1252 (N.D. Ill. 1997), where the court stated that congressional failure to codify the
Second Circuit test does not equate to congressional disapproval).
41. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 1999).
42. 141 CONG. REC. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
43. Janine C. Guido, Note, Seeking Enlightenment from Above: Circuit Courts
Split on the Interpretation of the Reform Act’s Heightened Pleading Requirement, 66
BROOKLYN L. REV. 501, 541 (2000).
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opportunistic plaintiffs from bringing frivolous suits. Among the stated
goals of the PSLRA was to help deter plaintiff’s attorneys from bringing
“strike suits.”44 Typically filed in response to significant drop in share
value, strike suits rarely contain specific allegations of fraud or impropriety.45
By definition, these suits represent bad faith efforts to reach excessive
settlements and accompanying attorneys’ fees.46
Congressional proponents of the PSLRA argued that strike suits
benefit only the attorneys involved and are detrimental to the corporation
and the shareholders.47 As will be explained below, a sufficiently low
pleading standard places a corporation in a situation where they will be
willing to pay several million dollars to settle a suit that is largely
without merit.
Strike suits can place corporate defendants in a situation where it is
better to settle a frivolous suit for millions of dollars than risk litigation.48
The following example illustrates a situation in which a corporation
would rather settle for $10,000,000 than proceed with litigation, despite
having a very strong case.
44. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683
(“The Committee heard substantial testimony that today certain lawyers file frivolous
‘strike’ suits alleging violations of the Federal securities laws in the hope that defendants
will quickly settle to avoid the expense of litigation.”); see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a strike suit as “[a] suit (esp. a derivative
action), often based on no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to
obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.”).
45. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (“These suits, which unnecessarily increase the cost of
raising capital and chill corporate disclosure, are often based on nothing more than a
company’s announcement of bad news, not evidence of fraud.”). This chilling effect is a
result of public officers’ fears that disclosure will naturally result in an increase in suits
brought against them.
46. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-50 (1995), reprinted in JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 724–26 (2d ed. 1997). The complaints are
usually based on minimum investigation, perhaps even so lacking as to warrant Rule 11
sanctions, and plead general allegations. See id. at 725. The problem is “compounded
by the reluctance of many judges to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, except in those cases involving truly outrageous misconduct.” H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730. The attorney often
engages in abusive settlement tactics, which induce inefficient settlements. See COX,
supra, at 725; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (“The private securities litigation system is
too important to the integrity of American capital markets to allow this system to be
undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing abusive and
meritless suits.”).
47. COX, supra note 46, at 725.
48. See Stanford Law School, Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, at
http://securities.stanford.edu (last updated May 20, 2005) (observing that since the
passage of the PSLRA, “[t]he dollar magnitude of settlement has increased noticeably”).
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Huge Corporation (Huge), on the heels of three quarters of consistent
financial gains, faces expectations that they are unable to meet. In order
to remain in compliance with SEC regulations, Huge releases news of
the disappointing earnings via a press release. Shortly thereafter, Huge
receives notice of a shareholders’ derivative action. Huge, and all parties
involved, are aware that the suit is largely without merit. The members
of the class claim that Huge knew that the projections were overly
optimistic and failed to correct them sooner in an effort to artificially
inflate stock prices. The negative earnings resulted in a 20% decrease in
the value of Huge common stock (the stock went from $10 per share to
$8 per share). Huge currently has 100,000,000 shares of common stock
outstanding. Thus the resulting loss in market capitalization equals
$200,000,000.49
Assume the cost of discovery for Huge would be $1,000,000. Huge,
knowing the suit is largely without merit, can expect a high probability
of success. Assume the probability of success is 95%.50 In such a case,
Huge can expect that, on average, the corporation will lose $10,000,000
if it litigates the case, plus the $1,000,000 cost of discovery.51 The total
cost of the litigation to the corporation would exceed the easily
calculable costs of discovery and expected payout. However, it would be
difficult to measure. The costs would also include damage to the
corporation’s image and opportunity costs associated with the time
employees spent defending the lawsuit (being deposed, answering
interrogatories, etc.). This lost time would be a significant cost when
one considers the types of employees who would be involved in
defending against an accusation of securities fraud.52

49. Calculated as follows: number of shares outstanding * reduction in value per
share. In this example the loss in market capitalization would be 100,000,000 multiplied
by 2, which equals a reduction in market capitalization of $200,000,000. The reader
should note that this example uses the relatively conservative assumption of 100,000,000
outstanding shares for a major corporation. Compare this figure with the number of
shares real life corporations would be likely to have outstanding—IBM and Microsoft
have 1.73 billion and 10.68 billion, respectively. Losses of 20% in the shares of either of
these companies could result in exposure to astronomical liability. Market Capitalization
Defined, at http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/03/031703.asp (March 17, 2003).
50. The likelihood of success in this example is deliberately high. The example is
designed to illustrate why a company will spend relatively large sums to settle strike
suits.
51. This figure represents the loss in market capitalization, $200,000,000, multiplied
by the probability that Huge will lose, 5%.
52. In all likelihood the defendants would be members of the board of directors,
high-ranking managers and corporate officers. Where losing a hundred hours of
janitorial time would not be financially damaging to most corporations, losing the same
amount of Chief Executive Officer’s time could be a damaging blow.
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Huge, as a rational entity, would be willing to pay up to $11,000,000
in settlement based on the easily calculable costs alone. This is a costly
settlement when one considers that the plaintiff class has a weak case
against the corporation. This example presents a bleak, but plausible,
example of how a plaintiff with little evidence can successfully attain a
sizeable settlement.
Abusive litigation tactics have the power to hurt not only the
corporation, but also the corporation’s shareholders. Strike suits
can hurt shareholders in several ways. Settlements that result in large
disbursements of corporate assets can represent inefficient allocation of
corporate assets. In addition, corporations expend significant resources
defending against charges of securities fraud. A typical expenditure in
the context of a derivative action is the formation of a special litigation
committee (SLC).53 An SLC is a board subcommittee charged with the
responsibility of recommending how to address the litigation. Money or
other consideration paid from the corporation to the shareholders as a
term of settlement can also be detrimental to the shareholders’ interests
where that consideration would create more shareholder value if retained
by the corporation.54
Perhaps the most substantial threat meritless suits can pose to
shareholders’ interests is the threat that an attorney representing a class
of shareholders with a frivolous state law claim can reach a settlement
agreement with the defendant that precludes a meritorious federal claim.
In Epstein v. MCA, Inc.,55 the Ninth Circuit was obliged to give full faith
and credit to a prior settlement involving a state law claim arising out of
the same transaction.56 The state law claim involved was unlikely to
succeed, but gave a second plaintiff’s firm a chance to get in on the
litigation.57 The result was that the settlement of a meritless claim
53. BAUMAN, supra note 7, at 947–53 (discussing the degree of deference courts
give to the decisions of an SLC, including whether the SLC’s decisions are entitled to the
benefits of the business judgment rule).
54. Id. at 286–87 (arguing that earning should only be retained, as opposed to paid
out as dividends, by the corporation where each dollar retained results in at least a one
dollar increase in the market value of the corporation).
55. 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1004 (1999). Matsushita
made a successful tender offer from MCA which “precipitated two lawsuits.” Id. at 643.
First, a Delaware class brought suit, alleging directoral breach of fiduciary duties. Id.
Second, a federal class brought suit, alleging violations of SEC rules. Id.
56. Id. at 650 (“[T]he Delaware judgment was not constitutionally infirm and must
be accorded full faith and credit.”).
57. BAUMAN, supra note 7, at 906.
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prevented a corporate defendant from having to litigate or settle a
potentially meritorious claim, or both. Whether one views the tactics of the
attorneys representing the state law class as ingenious or opportunistic, it
is clear that the result is not fair to the class of plaintiffs with the
meritorious federal claim.
B. How the Core Provisions of the PSLRA Disadvantage Plaintiffs
This section will survey the core provisions of the PSLRA and argue
that the impact of each provision disadvantages the plaintiff.
Specifically, this section will address the following provisions of the
Act: replacement of joint and several liability with proportionate
liability,58 limitations placed on damages,59 the certification to be filed
with plaintiff’s complaint,60 and an increased emphasis on the use of
sanctions.61 The trend where specific provisions reduce plaintiff class
bargaining position, can be seen throughout the PSLRA; it is present in
each phase of any private securities litigation, from appointment of lead
plaintiff 62 to calculation of damages.63
1. Proportionate Liability Versus Joint and Several Liability
The PSLRA narrowly limits the situations in which joint and several
liability will apply to defendants found liable of securities fraud.64
Under the new rule, a defendant subject to a final judgment will only be
held jointly and severally liable upon findings that said defendant
“knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws.”65 A knowing
violation occurs when a defendant “makes an untrue statement of a
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f) (2004).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2004).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A) (2004).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2004).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2004). This Comment does not discuss the implications
of lead plaintiff appointments on bargaining leverage. However, it is worth noting that
the provision probably benefits defendants. In creating a system where the lead plaintiff
will usually be an institutional shareholder, the PSLRA attempts to place control of the
litigation with investors, rather than with attorneys. In theory, this would prevent filings
where the attorney’s sole ambition was collecting fees, as institutional investors would
hire firms whose intent was to pursue the litigation in the investors’ best interest.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2004).
64. PSLRA UPDATE, supra note 31, at 55–56 (noting the confusing legislative
history of the damages provision. Specifically, how one version of the PSLRA made
joint and several liability available only in the case of knowing violation of the Exchange
Act was abandoned in favor of a version which provided that joint and several liability
can be available for a “knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws,” which
would include not only the Exchange Act, but also the Securities Act, the Investment
Company Act, and the Investment Advisers Act).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A) (2004).

792

MULREED.DOC

[VOL. 42: 779, 2005]

6/7/2005 9:47 AM

Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

material fact, with actual knowledge that the representation is false”66 or
fails to disclose a fact “with actual knowledge that, as a result of the
omission, one of the material representations . . . is false.”67 The Exchange
Act expressly states that reckless conduct does not constitute a knowing
violation and therefore does not trigger the application of joint and
several liability.68
Joint and several liability favors plaintiffs.69 A plaintiff successful
against multiple defendants under joint and several liability can recover
her entire judgment from any defendant.70 Conversely, a plaintiff
successful against multiple defendants under pure comparative liability
can only recover from each defendant according to that defendant’s
relative fault. Joint and several liability has been widely discarded in
favor of proportionate liability.71 However, joint and several liability
remains intact where the plaintiff(s) suffers an indivisible injury caused
by multiple defendants.72 The nature of the injury in securities litigation
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(10)(A)(i)(I) (2004).
67. Id.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(10)(B) (2004). The PSLRA requires that the jury answer
special interrogatories, or in a bench trial, that the judge make specific findings as
to whether each defendant has knowingly violated securities laws. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(f)(3)(A) (2004). In jurisdictions that allow liability to be based on recklessness,
one can anticipate that joint and several liability will be used less frequently, as
proportionately fewer liable defendants will have acted intentionally. Cf. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (providing joint and several liability for controlling persons, unless said persons
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the tortious acts).
69. See Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation (pt. 5), 99 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1534 (1986) (arguing that joint and several liability encourages minimally culpable
parties to ensure that more culpable parties comply with the law). These minimally
parties, acting rationally in their own self interest, will effectively act an additional
monitoring device, protecting innocent third parties from harm in the interest of limiting
their own exposure to liability. The article then notes that in the absence of joint and
several liability these less culpable parties have no incentive to monitor other potentially
culpable parties.
70. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (8th ed. 2004) (“[E]ach liable party is
individually responsible for the entire obligation . . . .”).
71. Mark M. Hager, What’s (Not!) in a Restatement? ALI Issue-Dodging on
Liability Apportionment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 77, 98–99 (2000) (“Abandonment or
modification of joint and several liability is arguably the chief fruit of states’ tort reform
campaigns over the past two decades, despite the fact that joint and several liability is a
longstanding and traditional common law doctrine . . . .”).
72. Am. Motorcycle Ass’n v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 578 P.2d 899
(Cal. 1978); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1293 n.9 (8th Cir. 1997)
(“The single indivisible injury rule imposes joint and several liability when two or more
persons acting independently cause harm to a third person through consecutive acts . . .
related in point of time. If the harm is indivisible, each actor is liable for the entire
harm.”) (emphasis added).
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seems to justify the application of joint and several liability.73
Maintaining joint and several liability for defendants in securities
litigation actions would have the definite effect of increasing shareholder
advantage in negotiating settlements. Proportionate liability’s most salient
problem is that a successful plaintiff may be unable to collect the entire
share owed to her due to the insolvency of one or more defendants.74
Joint and several liability frees the plaintiff from the risk associated with
defendant insolvency by allowing plaintiff to recover the entire damages
award from a single solvent defendant. Thus, plaintiffs prefer joint and
several liability because the insolvency of either defendant is not a
potential bar to recovery.75
While critics question joint and several liability’s fairness towards the
defendant,76 it certainly represents the most advantageous system of
liability for the plaintiff. The regime also pragmatically recognizes that
tort law is unable to deter insolvent defendants. Joint and several liability is
desirable in that it forces a culpable defendant, rather than a comparatively
innocent plaintiff, to internalize the risk associated with an insolvent
defendant’s inability to pay.
The PSLRA attempts to lessen the potential harshness of pure
proportionate liability through its “Uncollectible Share” provision,77
which creates a system of modified comparative liability.78 The PSLRA
73. Securities litigation plaintiffs suffer an indivisible injury (reduction in the
market price of the securities they own), caused by multiple defendants. Thus, securities
litigation plaintiffs satisfy the requirements for the application of joint and several
liability.
74. For example, assume the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of $1,000,000 from
two defendants (“D1” and “D2” respectively). D1 is a corporation worth several million
dollars and D2 is an insolvent individual. If the applicable liability regime is one of joint
and several liability, plaintiff can attain the entire judgment from D1. D1 would then be
entitled to receive a contribution from D2, equaling D2’s relative fault.
75. Under a proportionate liability system, plaintiff is entitled to recover from D1
only the proportion of the damages for which the fact finder determined D1 was
responsible. Plaintiff would bear the risk of loss associated with any given defendant
being unable to pay his own share of the damages. In situations where proportionate
liability applies, a plaintiff may be placed in the dangerous position of being
undercompensated for his injuries. This is particularly troublesome where the damage
award consists entirely of compensatory damages. For example, a personal injury
plaintiff in such a situation might be forced to pay his own medical bills or simply absorb
a loss incurred from missing work.
76. See Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation
of Caps on Damages and Limitations in Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
628, 636 (1988); Craig N. Johnston, Current Landowner Liability Under CERCLA:
Restoring the Need for Due Diligence, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 401, 424 (1998)
(discussing Congress’s refusal to adopt joint and several liability in regard to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act due to
concerns over the doctrine’s unfairness to certain defendants).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(4) (2004).
78. The PSLRA’s liability apportionment regime is one of modified comparative
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allows plaintiff to recover an uncollectible share79 from the solvent
defendant in two situations.80 The poverty provision allows the plaintiff
to hold each culpable defendant liable for the entire sum of the damages
provided plaintiff has limited economic means.81 Specifically, plaintiff
must prove that the recoverable damages are at least 10% of the
plaintiff’s net worth, and that the plaintiff’s net worth is less that
$200,000.82 This limitation eliminates the vast majority of shareholders
and makes the provision largely useless.83
Where plaintiff’s financial status removes him from the poverty
provision, a solvent defendant may still have to cover all or part of
another defendant’s liability.84 However, the solvent defendant’s additional
liability may not exceed one-half of his proportionate share.85 Thus,
where one of two equally culpable defendants becomes insolvent,
plaintiff will be able to recover 75% of the total damages from the
solvent defendant.86 In a situation where the solvent defendant was
more than twice as liable as the insolvent defendant, the plaintiff would
be able to recover the complete damage award from the solvent

liability because it has the power to force a party to pay a higher share of the damages
than the jury determines she is liable. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(4) (2004).
79. An uncollectible share is the amount of a given defendant’s share of the
damages that she is unable to pay due to insolvency.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(4)(A) (2004)(“[If] the court determines that all or part of
the share of the judgment of the covered person is not collectible against that covered
person, and is also not collectable against [a person described in the joint and several
liability section], each covered person . . . shall be liable for the uncollectible share . . . .”).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(4)(A)(i) (2004) (providing that “[e]ach covered person
shall be jointly and severally liable for the uncollectible share”).
82. Id.
83. It should be remembered that the size of a shareholder’s financial stake in a
company influences lead plaintiffs selection. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2004)
(establishing a rebuttable presumption that the lead plaintiff should be a person who “has
the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class”). It is very unlikely that the
lead plaintiff will be worth less than $200,000. See 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(f)(4)(A)(iii) (2004)
(establishing that calculation of net worth, which is established prior to the sale of
purchase of the question security, includes all personal assets, including investments in
real and personal property). In fact, the shareholders with the largest vested interest are
likely to be institutional shareholders, whose net worth will easily exceed the $200,000
maximum allowable for the imposition of joint and several liability.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(4)(A)(ii) (2004).
85. Id.
86. Assume P is entitled to $100 and D1 and D2 were each 50% liable. D1 is
solvent. D2 is insolvent. D1 will be forced to pay $75, which represents D1’s personal
liability plus an additional one-half of D1’s liability that will be used to cover D2’s
uncollectible share.

795

MULREED.DOC

6/7/2005 9:47 AM

defendant.87 While each of these situations is roughly palatable for both
plaintiff and the solvent defendant, as plaintiff receives the majority of
the damages and defendant pays an amount that is arguably within the
limits of his actual culpability,88 other plausible situations are gravely
unjust to the plaintiff.89
Regardless of the fairness of joint and several liability to the parties, it
is clear that its impact is to reduce the probability that plaintiff will be
able to recover the full amount of damages awarded to her. The
possibility that plaintiff will not be able to recover the entire damages
award will naturally be contemplated by the parties in settlement
negotiations. There is a direct correlation between plaintiff’s chance of
full recovery and the plaintiff’s bargaining leverage.90 A plaintiff could
not rightly calculate an appropriate settlement figure without first
considering the probability that either defendant will become insolvent
and will not be able to pay his share. Instead, the plaintiff’s estimation
of what she is entitled to must include the portion of the damages that
she will be likely to recover.
Assume that plaintiff would be entitled to $10,000,000 in damages if
successful at trial, and that there is a 90% chance of success. A plaintiff
who is certain to recover the entire sum of the damages, if successful at
trial, possibly because of the applicability of joint and several liability,
may be able to expect a settlement of around $9,000,000.91 Conversely, a
plaintiff with the same chances of success at trial and the same expected
87. Assuming D1’s is at least 66.67% liable, P will be able to recover 100% of the
damages from D1. This is true because any number greater than or equal to 66.67%
times 1.5 equals a number greater than 1. As 1 represents the total of the damages
award, P will be able to recover the entire award from D1.
88. See Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 849 (1998) (“Juries have been said, variously, to be
incompetent, capricious, unreliable, biased, sympathy-prone, confused, hostile to corporate
defendants and doctors, gullible, excessively generous in awarding compensatory damages,
and out of control when awarding punitive damages.”).
89. An example would be a situation where the solvent defendant, D1, is
responsible for 5% of the damages and the insolvent defendant, D2, is responsible for
95% of the damages. In this situation the most P can hope to recover from the solvent
defendant is 7.5% of the total damages. D1’s liability (5%) times statutory maximum
which D1 could be forced to pay (1.5) equals 7.5%. Such an apportionment of liability
is not improbable. For instance, suppose that D2 is an independent contractor, working
in concert with a brokerage house, and D1 is a large corporation or the brokerage house
that hired D2. In this situation, we can easily imagine D2 having relatively limited
financial resources, especially in view of the potentially astronomical damages in a
shareholder’s derivative suit, while D1 had the power to absorb the damages without
going bankrupt.
90. Or, in the alternative, there is an inverse correlation between the probability
that the plaintiff will be denied full recovery and the plaintiff’s bargaining leverage.
91. This figure represents what plaintiff expects to win at trial, multiplied by the
plaintiff’s chance of succeeding at trial ($10,000,000 * 90%).
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judgment might have to settle for a lower figure if there is an increased
chance that the plaintiff will be unable to recover due to insolvency of
either defendant.
Assume, for example, that plaintiff estimates that each defendant is
equally culpable,92 and that there is a 90% chance that one defendant
will go bankrupt. Plaintiff will estimate the expected value of two
possible outcomes—each defendant is solvent, or one defendant becomes
insolvent—as follows. In possible outcome number one, each defendant
is able to pay his or her own share, and the expected value equals
$9,000,000.93 In possible outcome number two, one of the defendants
becomes insolvent and is unable to pay any of his share of the damages.
In such a case, the expected value equals $6,750,000.94 These two figures
represent the complete range of outcomes based on the noted assumptions.
Plaintiff must then consider the probability of each of the two possible
outcomes occurring. In this example, possible outcome number one has
a probability of 10% and possibility number two has a probability of
90%. Plaintiff can expect that she will be able to recover $6,975,000.95
This figure represents an adequate, but comparatively unsatisfactory,
settlement figure for the plaintiff.96
In adopting a system of modified comparative liability, the PSLRA
forces the parties to anticipate lower damages than they would under a
system of joint and several liability. The application of comparative
liability reduces the amount a rational plaintiff can expect to recover in
pretrial settlement negotiations. Accordingly, should the parties attempt
to negotiate a settlement before the litigation, the plaintiff will be placed
in a disadvantaged position where she can expect a lower settlement
price. The PSLRA’s liability apportionment regime is consistent with
the Act’s overall purpose of discouraging the filing of frivolous
securities suits by placing plaintiffs in a disadvantaged position.
92. Thus, each defendant would be responsible for $4,500,000 in damages.
93. This figure represents plaintiff recovering $4,500,000 from each defendant.
94. Calculate as follows: (D1’s share of the judgment) + (Amount of uncollectible
share that D1 will be forced to pay). In this example: ($4,500,0000) + ($4,500,000 *
0.5). This hypothetical assumes that a defendant has the resources to pay either all of his
share of the debt or becomes insolvent and is unable to pay any of his share of the debt.
95. Calculated as: (Probability of outcome 1) * (Expected value of outcome 1) +
(Probability of outcome 2) * (Expected value of outcome 2). In this example: (10%) *
($9,000,000) + (90%) * $6,750,000).
96. In the preceding example plaintiff would anticipate being able to collect
$9,000,000 under joint and several liability and only $6,975,000 under modified
comparative liability.
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2. Cap on Damages
Calculating damages is among the most confusing and controversial
areas of securities litigation.97 In general, damages sought in securities
litigation can be divided into two classes: direct damages, where the
plaintiff sues the party from whom he bought the securities at issue, and
indirect damages, where the plaintiff is suing anyone not involved in his
purchase of the securities at issue.98 Direct damages for misstatements
are the simplest type of damages to calculate and allow the plaintiff to
recover his entire loss from the culpable party.99 In the PSLRA’s legislative
history, the House Conference Report alludes to direct damages as the
typical measure of damages in securities fraud litigation.100 Adopting
direct damages would have substantially advantaged plaintiffs by
increasing the amount of damages they were likely to recover if
victorious at trial.
Instead, the PSLRA adopted a cap on damages.101 The damage limitation
provision creates the possibility of undercompensation for plaintiffs who
sell their shares during a period of market overreaction following the
disclosure of information that causes a decrease in the price of the
security.102 While this limitation creates a controversy as to what it
implies for congressional economic policy,103 its implications for private
97. DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL 281 (6th ed. 1998)
(“Because of the great variety of situations giving rise to liability, it is difficult to
generalize about the computation of damages.”); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741 (“The current method of calculating
damages in 1934 Act securities fraud cases is complex and uncertain.”).
98. RATNER, supra note 97, at 281–83.
99. Id. at 281–82 (noting that the measure of damages paid to a plaintiff-purchaser
by a defendant-seller is typically the price the plaintiff paid for the securities minus the
price of the security when sold by plaintiff or the price at the time of initiation of the suit).
100. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (“Typically, in an action involving a
fraudulent misstatement or omission, the investor’s damages are presumed to be the
difference between the price the investor paid for the security and the price of the
security on the day the corrective information gets disseminated to the market.”).
101. [I]n any private action . . . in which the plaintiff seeks to establish damages
by reference to the market price of a security, the award of damages to the
plaintiff shall not exceed the difference between the purchase or sale price paid
or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the subject security and the
mean trading price of that security during the 90-day period beginning on the
date on which the information correcting the misstatement or omission that is
the basis for the action is disseminated to the market.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2004).
102. See Nathaniel Carden, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879,
894–95 (1998).
103. Id. at 894–98. Carden argues that Congress implicitly rejected the efficient
capital market hypothesis, as the damages limitation presupposes that investors could
“beat the market” if they invested immediately after the release of damaging news and
held a security until the market returned to a rational level. Id. at 895.
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securities plaintiffs are clear.104 The damage limitation provision of the
PSLRA reaffirms congressional intent to discourage the filing of frivolous
lawsuits by reducing plaintiff’s bargaining leverage.
Under the damages provision, a plaintiff is only entitled to recover the
difference between the sale price of the security and the security’s mean
price over a ninety-day period following disclosure of the withheld
information.105 This limitation derives from the assumption that markets
will overreact to certain types of news.
The following example shows how the damage limitation works.
Party A purchases 10,000 shares of common stock in X Corporation at
$10 per share on day one.106 X Corporation’s common stock was somewhat
overvalued on day one based on pervasive accounting irregularities.
When the news of these irregularities becomes public on day two, the
market for X common stock drastically weakens. A, afraid that the news
of irregularities and subsequent legal action will render the stock
worthless, sell all of his shares of X at $5 per share on day three.107 The
easiest way to calculate A’s damages based on the fraud is by reference
to the market price of the security. One must simply subtract the sale
price he received for the stock on day three from the purchase price he
paid on day one.108 This method of calculation creates total damages of
$50,000, which accurately represents the losses A incurred.109

104. See id. at 896.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2004).
106. Thus, A has invested $100,000 in X. See PSLRA Damages Limitation
Provision Chart, infra p.22.
107. Thus, A received $50,000 from the sale of X securities. See PSLRA Damages
Limitation Chart, infra p.22.
108. (10,000 shares * $10/share) - (10,000 shares * $5/share), or simply
$100,000 - $50,000 = $50,000.
109. A could arguably also seek incidental costs associated with the transactions,
however, these will be omitted in the interest of maintaining simplicity. Incidental costs
could be significant, depending on the method of trading A engages in. If A manages his
own trades via an online broker, incidental costs would be minor. However, if A trades
through a traditional broker, it is likely that he paid a substantial amount of money in
brokers’ fees.
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Under the damage calculation method adopted by the PSLRA, A
might collect far lower damages. Assume further that the price of X
common stock rebounded from the low of $5, the price at which A sold,
to $9, and then to a more rational $7, resulting in an average price of $7
for the ninety days following disclosure of the irregularities.110 In this
scenario the plaintiff’s recoverable damages per share, as measured
under the PSLRA damage provision,111 would be limited to $3 per share,
with total damages equaling only $30,000.112 Thus, the PSLRA damages
limitation provision would undercompensate A by $20,000.113
Limiting the damages available to a plaintiff class is the simplest, and
arguably the most effective, means to ensure that the class will be less
likely to establish an advantageous settlement, short of blatantly barring
the cause of action. Thus, the damages limitation provision is consistent
with the core provisions of the PSLRA in discouraging the filing of
frivolous lawsuits by reducing the attractiveness of securities fraud
claims.

110. See PSLRA Damages Limitation Provision Chart, infra.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2004).
112. (10,000 shares * $10/share) – (10,000 shares * $7/share) = $30,000.
113. This is found by subtracting A’s recoverable loss ($30,000) from his actual
loss ($50,000). Again, bear in mind that this example assumes that transaction costs are
zero.
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3. Increased Emphasis on the Imposition of Sanctions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11) governs the imposition
of sanctions for abusive pleading practices in litigation.114 The PSLRA
departs from the common application of Rule 11 by placing an increased
emphasis on the use of sanctions as a means to deter frivolous pleadings.
The Act forces the court to review the pleadings for Rule 11
violations,115 to impose sanctions where violations are found,116 and
creates a presumption that attorneys’ fees and costs are proper when one
party fails to comply with Rule 11(b).117 These sanction rules reduce
plaintiff’s bargaining position by increasing the likelihood that the
plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel will face sanctions.118
114. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1) (2004) (“[U]pon final adjudication of the action, the
court shall include in the record specific findings regarding compliance by each party
and each attorney representing any party with each requirement of Rule 11(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to any complaint, responsive pleading, or dispositive
motion.”) (emphasis added).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(2) (“If the court makes a finding under paragraph (1) that
a party or attorney violated any requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as to any complaint, responsive pleading, or dispositive motion, the court
shall impose sanctions on such party or attorney . . . .”); See also Gurary v. Nu-Tech
Bio-Med, Inc., 303 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2002) (attributing the rule change to
“[congressional concern] that under existing Rule 11 practice, when a court did award
Rule 11 sanctions, the award was ‘generally insufficient to make whole the victim of the
Rule 11 violation . . . .’”) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP NO. 104-369, at 39 (1995), reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 738). Cf. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393
(1990) (noting that the central goal of Rule 11 is deterrence and streamlining the judicial
process, not punishment).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(3). (“[There is a rebuttable presumption that the
appropriate sanction] for failure of any responsive pleading or dispositive motion to
comply with any requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an
award to the opposing party of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation . . . .”). Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11(b) requires that any representation before the court not be for an improper purpose, be
based on existing law and evidentiary support, and that denials of allegations are
warranted. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
118. The plain language of [Rule 11] again provides the answer. It speaks of
attorneys and parties in a single breath and applies to them a single standard:
“The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that
it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”
Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 541–42 (1991).
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The PSLRA’s requirement that the court make specific findings as to
potential Rule 11 violations is not present in the course of ordinary
litigation.119 Instead, Rule 11 gives courts the right, but not the obligation,
to make specific findings concerning Rule 11(b) violations.120 In increasing
the level of Rule 11 review, the PSLRA actually contradicts the purpose
of the 1993 amendments to the Rule. The amendments’ goal was to
minimize the frequency with which courts made Rule 11 findings.121
When considered in conjunction with other applicable provisions, in
particular the PSLRA stay provision,122 and the requirement that plaintiff
pleads with particularity,123 mandatory sanctions for filing overly prolix
pleadings place the plaintiff in a very precarious position. While the
plaintiff wants to include as many claims as possible, he must be very
careful when doing so, as the PSLRA increases the probability that
plaintiff and plaintiff’s attorney will face sanctions.124 Thus, one can
logically anticipate situations where plaintiffs will fail to include certain
allegations because of uncertainty about their validity and the fear of
sanctions. Such plaintiffs run the risk of losing said claims, and place
themselves in a disadvantaged situation, when compared to plaintiffs
who do not face heightened Rule 11 requirements. The PSLRA’s increased
emphasis on the use of sanctions is consistent with the core purpose of
the PSLRA—disadvantaging plaintiffs and discouraging the filing of
frivolous lawsuits by reducing the attractiveness of bringing securities
suits.
4. Certification to be Filed with Complaint and Appointment
of Lead Plaintiff
An individual seeking to serve as a lead plaintiff in securities fraud
class action must first overcome several barriers, including filing a
certification with her complaint.125 While certain requirements offer no
119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A)–(B).
120. Id. (stating that a motion for Rule 11 findings may be made by the opposing
party, or “the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to
violate subdivision (b)”) (emphasis added).
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993 advisory committee notes) (“The revision . . . should
reduce the number of motions for sanctions . . . .”); see also Ridder v. City of
Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 293–94 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that the 1993 revisions to Rule
11 “place[] greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions,” and that “Rule 11’s
ultimate goal [is] deterrence, rather than compensation”).
122. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(3) (2004).
123. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
124. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533,
541 (1991) (noting that plain language imposes the same standard for both parties and
attorneys, that of a “reasonable inquiry” under the circumstances).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A) (2004).
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genuine challenge to the plaintiff,126 others create substantive burdens
that may pose legitimate challenges.127 The certification also requires
the potential plaintiff to state facts under oath regarding transactions
involving the security, or securities, in question.128 It may be difficult
for plaintiff to plead such detail without the aid of discovery.
The new lead plaintiff procedure instructs the court to adopt a
presumption that the “most adequate plaintiff” is the investor who makes
a motion to serve as lead plaintiff,129 has the largest financial interest in
the relief sought,130 and satisfies the requirements of FRCP 23.131 The
126. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii) (2004) (requiring the plaintiff to
certify that she has read the complaint, authorize its filing, and be willing to serve as lead
plaintiff, including a willingness to provide testimony).
127. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32–33 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731–32 (“Professional plaintiffs who own a nominal number of
shares in a wide array of public companies permit lawyers readily to file abusive
securities class action lawsuits. . . . The Conference Committee believes that several new
rules will effectively discourage the use of professional plaintiffs.”); H.R. CONF. REP.
NO. 104-369, at 33 (“To further deter the use of professional plaintiffs . . . .”); see 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(v) (2004) (requiring the certification to “identif[y] any other
action under [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.], filed during the 3-year period preceding the date
on which the certification is signed by the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff has sought to
serve as a representative party on behalf of a class . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. §78u4(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2004) (providing that plaintiff may not accept any payment for acting as
lead plaintiff, except for his pro rata share and any other compensation ordered or
approved by the court); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4) (2004) (stating that lead plaintiff is
entitled to only his pro rata share and “reasonable costs and expenses (including lost
wages) directly relating to the representation of the class . . .”).
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2004) (requiring that the certification “states
that the plaintiff did not purchase the security that is the subject of the complaint at the
direction of plaintiff’s counsel or in order to participate in any private action . . .”); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2004) (providing that certification must list all
transactions the plaintiff made in the security during the class period).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(aa) (2004). See also H.R. CONF. REP. NO.
104-369, at 32–33 (noting that the “most adequate plaintiff” provision was drafted in
response to the Conference Committee’s concerns caused by the “race to the courthouse”
among several plaintiff’s lawyers, each of whom wanted to be the first to file). The
result of this desire to file first is that complaints are increasingly filed without proper
diligence. This race was encouraged by the traditional “first come, first serve” method
used for appointment of lead plaintiff, wherein courts tended to consider the promptness
with which a complaint was filed, rather than the diligence employed in drafting the
complaint. Id. at 33. The Conference Committee sought to rid securities litigation of the
negative results of the race to the courthouse by making “the selection of the lead
plaintiff and lead counsel [dependent] on considerations other than how quickly a
plaintiff has filed its complaint.” Id.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2004); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at
34. The previous system for appointment of lead plaintiff discouraged institutional
investors, who hold over half of the equity in domestic markets, from acting as lead
plaintiffs. The Conference Committee went on to explain:
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PSLRA provides that the presumption of the “most adequate plaintiff” is
rebuttable,132 but it does not address when it is possible to challenge the
presumption.133 Nor does it address the issue of whether defendants
have standing to challenge the “most adequate plaintiff” presumption.134
Certain courts have held that a defendant in a securities class action
has standing to object to lead plaintiff appointment.135 These courts
justify their rule as being “consistent with the goal of alleviating the

[We believe] that increasing the role of institutional investors in class actions
will ultimately benefit shareholders and assist courts by improving the quality
of representation in securities class actions. . . .
. . . Institutional investors and other class members with large amounts at
stake will represent the interests of the plaintiff class more effectively than
class members with small amounts at stake.
Id. The PSLRA further encourages institutional shareholders to act as lead plaintiffs by
creating extensive notice obligations on the individual seeking to serve as lead plaintiff.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A) (2004). Specifically, said individual is responsible for filing,
within twenty days of filing the complaint, a notice which informs potential class
members of the action, its claims, and the purported class period. 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(A)(i)(I) (2004). Federal common law holds that a plaintiff generally bears the
entire cost of notice. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 349, 356–59
(1978). This partially justifies the most adequate plaintiff presumption, as the defendant
with the largest financial stake is more likely to be able to bear the costs of litigation.
The most adequate plaintiff presumption is the most substantial improvement to private
securities litigation caused by the PSLRA. It stands as somewhat of an outlier in the
PSLRA as a provision that benefits plaintiffs. The presumption benefits plaintiffs
because a plaintiff with a substantial financial interest in the litigation is likely to be an
institutional investor. Institutional investors have more resources than a typical investor
and are able to expend more time and money monitoring the course of the litigation.
Since all plaintiffs recover a pro rata share of the damages, each plaintiff benefits from
the most zealous representation possible.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(cc) (2004). For a class to be maintainable it
must first meet the following requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a):
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation of the class. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a). In a shareholder derivative suit the lead plaintiff will usually satisfy these
four requirements. Numerosity is satisfied because corporations typically have enough
shareholders to make joinder impracticable, commonality is satisfied because all
shareholders are suing based on common issues of law and fact, typicality is satisfied
because each shareholder’s injury arise from the ownership of stock, only their pro rata
share differs, and finally, adequate representation should be satisfied because any
rational self-interested individual or entity will prosecute the claim to the best of their
ability, because their personal recovery is contingent upon the group’s recovery.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II) (2004).
133. Id. However, the Conference Committee report alludes to “potential conflicts”
that may arise from institutional investors acting as lead plaintiff, which may imply that
the presumption can be properly rebutted when conflicts arise from institutional
investors acting as lead plaintiffs. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34.
134. Tiffany M. Wong, Comment, Defendants’ Standing to Oppose Lead Plaintiff
Appointment Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 833, 836.
135. King v. Livent, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that
“nothing in the text of the Reform Act precludes or limits the right of defendants to be
heard on [the appointment of lead plaintiff and class counsel].”).
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abuses of the class action device in securities litigation.”136 Here, the courts
exhibit what this Comment repeatedly asserts: any ambiguous provision
must be read in accord with the PSLRA’s core purpose of deterring
frivolous lawsuits. This principle of statutory construction, known as
purposivism, instructs judges to consider congressional purpose or policy
behind the statute’s enactment when interpreting its meaning.137 “Instead of
attempting to reconstruct how the legislature would have likely addressed a
particular issue, purposivism calls on judges to identify the statute’s
purpose and resolve the dispute at issue in light of that purpose.”138
C. Purposivism in Securities Litigation Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court employed a purposivist reading of the Exchange
Act in a recent private securities litigation case.139 In United States v.
O’Hagan, the Court validated misappropriation theory as the basis for
insider trading liability because the theory was “well tuned to an
animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities
markets and thereby promote investor confidence.”140 Richard Walker
and David Levine, former senior officials at the SEC, support the
reasoning employed in O’Hagan and have since suggested that “[a] strict
textual reading of section 10(b) would not only invalidate the
misappropriation theory, but would eviscerate insider trading liability
altogether.”141 O’Hagan suggests that the Court prefers purposivism to
strict textual construction in determining section 10(b) liability.142 Thus,
purposivist statutory construction has been crucial in establishing the
current body of private securities litigation jurisprudence.143
136. Id. (quoting Howard Gunty Profit Sharing v. Quantum Corp., No. 96 Civ.
20711 SW, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1997)).
137. Ediberto Román, Statutory Interpretation in Securities Jurisprudence: A
Failure of Textualism, 75. NEB. L. REV. 377, 389 (1996).
138. Id. (citing Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and
the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation,
68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 815 (1994)).
139. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
140. Id. at 658.
141. Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of Central Bank’s Textualist
Approach—Attempts to Overdraw the Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,
19 (1997).
142. See id. at 21–22 (“As long as defendant’s conduct reasonably comes within the
flexible language of section 10(b) [textualist precedent] will not shield that defendant
from liability simply because the conduct has historically been described in specific
language not found in the statute.”).
143. Cf. Amy E. Fahey, Note, United States v. O’Hagan: The Supreme Court
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Because the scienter requirement is an ambiguous term,144 it should be
read consistently with its surrounding provisions and the purpose of the
PSLRA. This section has established that the core provisions of the
PSLRA disadvantage securities plaintiffs consistently with the Act’s
purpose. Thus, the scienter requirement should be interpreted in a
manner that furthers the congressional goal of discouraging frivolous
lawsuits by reducing plaintiff’s bargaining leverage.
III. SCIENTER
A. The Scienter Requirement Before the PSLRA
1. Second Circuit’s Pre-PSLRA Standard
Prior to the enactment of PSLRA, plaintiffs in the Second Circuit
faced the nation’s highest pleading standard. In the Second Circuit,
scienter was a necessary element of each 10b-5 action, but there was no
requirement that plaintiff go so far as to plead scienter with “great
specificity.”145 Second Circuit case law required that the facts alleged in
the plaintiff’s complaint “give[] rise to a ‘strong inference’ of fraudulent
intent.”146
Plaintiff could fulfill her burden and give rise to the strong inference
by alleging either (1) motive to commit securities fraud and an opportunity
to do so, or (2) facts constituting sufficient evidence of reckless or
conscious behavior.147 At the time, this was the most difficult standard
for plaintiffs to satisfy.
2. Ninth Circuit’s Pre-PSLRA Scienter Standard
In the Ninth Circuit, conclusory allegations of scienter were sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss.148 Alternatively, a plaintiff could allege
Abandons Textualism to Adopt the Misappropriation Theory, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
507, 532–34 (1998) (arguing that purposivism should not be used in interpreting section
10(b)).
144. The PSLRA refers to the “[r]equired state of mind” without providing a
description of the required state of mind. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2004).
145. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985)).
146. O’Brien v. Nat’l Prop. Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990)). See also
Eugene P. Caiola, Comment, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the Uniform
Securities Litigation Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 324–25 (2000).
147. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993).
148. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that under
the applicable standard the plaintiff “need ‘simply . . . say[] that scienter existed’ to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b).” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Glenfed, Inc.
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facts constituting circumstantial evidence of fraudulent behavior, provided
the allegations describe how defendant’s behavior was fraudulent.149 For
example, a plaintiff could allege that defendant disregarded a substantial
and unjustified risk that projected earnings were far in excess of likely
earnings. This standard, as first established by In re Glenfed, was admittedly
lenient.150 However, the court adhered to the lower standard, which the
justices read as the appropriate construction of the law, while implying
that the effect of a lower standard may bring about undesirable results.151
The split encouraged forum shopping.152 A typical shareholder’s
derivative suit will have plaintiffs in numerous states. In fact, it would
be unusual for the initiators of such a suit to be unable to find a potential
plaintiff in the Ninth Circuit, the most populous of the Federal Circuit
Courts,153 or the Second Circuit, where the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and many of the world’s largest institutional investors are
located. Defendants, due to their national characteristics, can also be
subject to service of process and proper jurisdiction in multiple
circuits.154 Thus, plaintiffs are free to sue in a jurisdiction that applies
law more conducive to their cause. This trend of forum shopping
continues under the post-PSLRA standards.155
Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994)).
149. Id. at 1083.
150. See In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1546–47 (noting that the
court might “like the effects” of heightening the applicable pleading standard). The
Glenfed court appeared to be implying that they would prefer a heightened pleading
standard because such a standard would be better able to deter frivolous lawsuits. Id. at
1546.
151. Id.
152. Laurae Rossi, Choosing the Best Standard of Pleading Under the 1995 Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, And Why The Ninth Circuit’s Standard Under In Re
Silicon Graphics Conquers the Battle of the Circuits, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 263, 265 (2002).
153. Office of the Circuit Executive, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit:
History & Guide to the U.S. Courts, at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Apr.
16, 2005).
154. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–99 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that defendants, despite not having extensive contacts with New York, were
properly subjected to personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York based
on their having securities listed on the NYSE and an investor relations office in New
York City).
155. See Stanford Law School, supra note 48 (noting that the Second Circuit’s
Southern District Court in New York, which currently imposes a lower standard than the
Ninth, is the most active district for private securities litigation). U.S. courts have
consistently discouraged forum shopping. See McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148,
157 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (noting that certification in diversity cases
serves to avoid the evil “of forum shopping that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
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B. The Post-PSLRA Circuit Split
The PSLRA was unsuccessful in resolving the circuit split over the
meaning of scienter because Congress failed to define scienter in the
Act. If the language of the PSLRA was less ambiguous, the circuit split
could have been resolved.156 Unfortunately, the language of the Act
leaves ample room for interpretation. Within a year of the PSLRA’s
passage Professor John Coffee compared it to “wet clay,” arguing that
the ultimate reading of the PSLRA lies with the federal courts, “the
master sculptor . . . that will spell the difference between high art and merely
competent mediocrity.”157 Professor Coffee’s metaphor has proven accurate,
as the various circuits have molded the PSLRA into their respective
visions of what the law should be. The Fourth Circuit may have been
wise to avoid this controversial circuit split in a recent decision.158
1. Second Circuit’s Post-PSLRA Standard
Second Circuit case law holds that the PSLRA did not change the
basic pleading requirements for private securities litigation.159 Plaintiff
may plead scienter by alleging specific facts that either (1) establish
73–77 (1938), was intended to prevent”) (citations omitted).
156. When a statute’s meaning is clear from the language alone, judicial inquiry as
to meaning is unnecessary. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54
(1992).
[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one, cardinal canon
before all others. . . . [C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there. . . . When the words of
a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: “judicial
inquiry is complete.”
Id. However, when a statute’s meaning is not apparent from its language, varying
judicial interpretation seems inevitable. Numerous circuit splits revolve around the
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. See, e.g., InvesSys, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill
Cos., 369 F.3d 16, 22–23 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2004) (demonstrating that the First Circuit
agreed with the Seventh Circuit, but disagreed with the Eight Circuit, over whether § 505
of the Copyright Act provides that attorneys should be reimbursed for computer-assisted
research); United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910, 912–14 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (demonstrating
that the D.C. Circuit disagreed with four other circuits over whether “cocaine base,” as
used in 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(B)(iii), applied only to crack and other smokeable versions
of cocaine, or to all base forms of cocaine).
157. Coffee, Jr., supra note 9, at 975.
158. See Svezzese v. Duratek, Inc., No. 02-1587, 2003 WL 21357313, at *5 (4th
Cir. June 12, 2003) (representing plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants engaged in a
scheme designed to inflate the price of Duratek stock). The court avoided taking a
position on the controversial circuit split by noting that the facts alleged by the plaintiff
class were insufficient to meet even the most lenient pleading standard. Id. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit managed to stay out of the fray.
159. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he PSLRA effectively
raised the nationwide pleading standard to that previously existing in this circuit and no
higher . . . .”).
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“both motive and opportunity to commit fraud,” or (2) constitute “strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.”160
The Second Circuit’s position is the overwhelming favorite among
commentators.161
Second Circuit courts have defended the motive and opportunity test
by holding that “[m]otives that are generally possessed by most corporate
directors and officers do not suffice; instead, plaintiffs must assert a
concrete and personal benefit to the individual defendants resulting from
the fraud.”162 A sufficient motive may be established where defendant
liquidates his holdings following misrepresentations, which artificially
inflate stock price.163 While the facts necessary to establish a sufficient
motive, those of a “concrete and personal” benefit,164 may initially seem
like a rare occurrence, they occur frequently in insider trading cases.165 A
plaintiff can satisfy the second means of pleading scienter by alleging
positive misstatements.166 Unsubstantiated allegations of misstatement
do not suffice in the Ninth Circuit.167

160. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2001). This test is identical to
that used in the Second Circuit before the PSLRA’s passage. The Second Circuit seems
to view the PSLRA’s scienter requirement as nothing more than a codification of prePSLRA Second Circuit case law. In fact, in explaining the ways in which a plaintiff may
meet her scienter requirement, the Kalnit court cited pre-PSLRA Second Circuit case
law. Id. (citing Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994))).
161. See Guido, supra note 43, at 534 (arguing that the PSLRA did not change the
substantive standard for scienter); Dunn, supra note 30, at 248–50 (arguing that textual
reading, legislative history, and policy goals favor reading scienter as unchanged under
the PSLRA); Erin Brady, Comment, Determining the Proper Pleading Standard Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 After In re Silicon Graphics, 28
PEPP. L. REV. 471 (2001) (relying on a textual reading to support the argument that the
Second Circuit’s standard is reflective of congressional intent).
162. Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 139.
163. Novak, 216 F.3d at 307–08.
164. Id. at 307.
165. See SEC v. Weissman, Litigation Release No. 17,068, 75 SEC Docket 1288
(July 18, 2001); SEC v. Schiffer, Litigation Release No. 17,191, 76 SEC Docket 237
(Oct. 16, 2001); SEC v. Iacovelli, Litigation Release No. 17,280, 76 SEC Docket 1526
(Dec. 19, 2001); SEC v. Thatcher, Litigation Release No. 17,353, 76 SEC Docket 2602
(Feb. 5, 2002); United States v. King, Litigation Release No. 17,398, 77 S.E.C. Docket
194 (Mar. 6, 2002).
166. Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 143–44.
167. Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. 380 F.3d 1226, 1231
(9th Cir. 2004) (requiring plaintiff be able to point to “hard numbers and make specific
allegations” to call into question the validity of public representations).
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2. Ninth Circuit’s Post-PSLRA Standard
a. Silicon Graphics I and II
In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation (“Silicon Graphics
I”) was the first case to decide that the PSLRA eliminated recklessness
as a basis for liability in securities fraud.168 In Silicon Graphics I, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California held
that Congress intended to abrogate the Second Circuit motive and
opportunity test as a sufficient basis for liability and “strengthen” the
pre-PSLRA scienter standard.169 The Silicon Graphics I court relied
heavily on the Conference Committee Report,170 a means of statutory
construction supported by even the staunchest of textualists.171
The Ninth Circuit expanded on the Silicon Graphics I standard in In re
Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation (“Silicon Graphics II”).172
The Silicon Graphics II court held that the PSLRA requires a plaintiff to
plead “particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate
recklessness.”173 Where ordinary recklessness is essentially heightened
negligence, and therefore can occur absent intentional conduct, deliberate
recklessness requires intentional action.174 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s
post-PSLRA scienter requirement differs from all pre-PSLRA rulings in
that it is the first to require intentional misconduct.175 This is, without
debate, the higher of the various standards.
The Ninth Circuit scienter standard as articulated in Silicon Graphics
II does not function as an absolute bar to plaintiff recovery. Instead, it
represents the most successful attempt to “eliminate frivolous or sham
actions, but not actions of substance.”176 Recent Ninth Circuit cases
168. 970 F. Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
169. Id. (“Motive, opportunity, and non-deliberate recklessness may provide some
evidence of intentional wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient to support scienter
unless the totality of the evidence creates a strong inference of fraud.”)
170. See id. (“In light of the confusion revealed in individual legislators’ statements,
the Court finds the Conference Committee Report and the ultimate adoption of the
Conference’s version of the bill even more persuasive.”).
171. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.) (“[T]he
authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on
the bill, which ‘represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those
Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.’”) (quoting Zuber
v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969).
172. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
173. Id. at 974 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 975–77.
175. Cf. Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999)
(implying that recklessness is not a form of intentional conduct); see also Caiola, supra
note 146, at 332.
176. Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. 380 F.3d 1226, 1235
(9th Cir. 2004).
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illustrate the balance that the circuit has struck between sustaining
meritorious claims and dismissing frivolous claims.
b. Oracle and the Specificity With Which Plaintiff Must Plead
In Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle (Oracle),177 allegations that
a business had constructive knowledge that it was not going to meet
financial expectations, when combined with allegations of insider
trading and accounting irregularities, were sufficient to plead scienter
under the PSLRA.178 The complaint’s specific factual allegations were
essential to the court’s findings. For example, a plaintiff may show that
a corporation made purposefully false representations by reference to
internal corporate data that contradicts public representations.179 However,
plaintiff can only rely on the presence of such internal records by
pleading “hard numbers or other specific information.”180 The requirement
that plaintiff plead specific facts in his complaint allows the Ninth
Circuit to distinguish between meritorious and meritless claims.181
In Oracle, the corporate defendant repeatedly asserted that it would
meet its earnings predictions of twelve cents per share and revenue
predictions of $2.9 billion for the fiscal quarter, despite a slowing
economy and the disappointing performance of one of the company’s
most important products.182 Statements made by Oracle’s Chief Executive
Officer (CEO),183 Chief Financial Officer,184 Executive Vice President,185
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1235.
179. See id. at 1230–31. “The most direct way to show both that a statement was
false when made and that the party making the statement knew that it was false is via
contemporaneous reports or data, available to the party, which contradict the statement.”
Id. at 1230.
180. Id. at 1231; See also In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d at 985 (“[A]
proper complaint which purports to rely on the existence of internal reports would
contain at least some specifics from those reports as well as such facts as may indicate
their reliability.”). Cf. Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that conclusory allegations that defendant had access to internal reports,
which were inconsistent with public representations, did not give rise to an inference that
defendant was deliberately reckless in making errant public representations).
181. Cf. Lipton, 284 F.3d at 1036.
182. Oracle, 380 F.3d at 1228.
183. Id. (“‘The economic slowdown isn’t hurting Oracle . . . because the company
has spent the past three years updating its product line to focus on software that helps
companies use the internet to cut costs and boost efficiency.’”).
184. Id. (“‘[T]he economy right now even though it’s slowing doesn’t seem to be
affecting us. We see no difference in demand for our upcoming third fiscal quarter.’”).
185. Id. (“‘[Oracle is experiencing] robust demand for both its database and applications
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and spokeswomen186 indicated that the corporation was making a
concerted effort to project the message that profits would be not be down
for the quarter. Plaintiffs were able to allege that these statements were
intentionally misleading by relying on statements of former Oracle
insiders, each of whom testified to a “major slowdown in sales.”187
Absent insider statements indicating that the public representations
were false, plaintiffs would not have been able to challenge the
legitimacy of the public representations.188 This rule prevents plaintiffs
from suing based on many public representations that ultimately prove
false, thus encouraging corporate disclosure. A rule that allows suits to
proceed on the inaccuracy of public statements, absent specific factual
allegations that suggest fraud, would chill corporate disclosure.
Suspicious insider trades indicate scienter by suggesting that corporate
insiders had knowledge that the company was withholding crucial
information from the market.189 The Ninth Circuit evaluates the suspiciousness
of insider trades by considering “(1) the amount and percentage of
shares sold; (2) timing of the sales; and (3) consistency with prior
trading history.”190 The Oracle court found that Larry Ellison, Oracle’s
CEO, engaged in suspicious insider trading by selling a substantial block
of shares prior to the announcement that Oracle failed to meet
earnings.191 Ellison’s behavior was particularly suspicious because he
had not sold Oracle shares during the previous five years.192 The test
employed in determining the suspiciousness of insider trades furthers the
goal of requiring plaintiff to plead with specificity.

businesses . . . Oracle says it is also seeing sustained demand for its database product, despite
industry-wide concern over contracting [information technology] budgets.’”).
186. “‘Oracle has yet to see any sign that its business is being hurt by the economic
slowdown or reported cuts to information-technology budgets’. . . . ‘[The] slowdown is
going to provide new opportunities for Oracle as companies need to streamline and be
more strategic about the technology they buy.’” Id. (quoting Oracle spokeswomen
Stephanie Aas and Jennifer Glass, respectively).
187. Id. at 1231 (“For example, an account manager for the western United States
said that ‘by the summer 2000, the telephones in General Business West ‘went dead.’’”).
188. Cf. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2001) (implying that
scienter can be established in the Second Circuit absent specific misstatements) and
Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d. Cir. 1999) (“The Second
Circuit has been lenient in allowing scienter issues to withstand summary judgment
based on fairly tenuous inferences.”).
189. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999).
190. Oracle, 380 F.3d at 1232 (citing Silicon Graphics II, 183 F.3d at 986). The
first consideration places reduced emphasis on the percentage of shares sold where
“stock sales result in a truly astronomical figure.” Oracle, 380 F.3d at 1232.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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Misleading or improper accounting practices also indicate that a
defendant possesses the requisite scienter to commit securities fraud.193
In Oracle, plaintiffs presented an expert witness who argued that questionable
accounting practices resulted in Oracle improperly recording $230
million as revenue.194 The assertions of the expert witness were sufficient
to give rise to an inference that Oracle engaged in misleading accounting
practices.195
Specific allegations that corporate officers had at least constructive
knowledge of corporate fraud are crucial to pleading scienter in the Ninth
Circuit.196 For example, where a CEO is personally involved in several
failed negotiations, it is inferred that he has constructive knowledge of the
impact the failed negotiations will have on the company’s ability to meet
its financial goals.197 Further, corporate officers who admittedly engage in
micromanagement are more likely to have constructive knowledge of
financial shortcomings.198
Oracle illustrates two essential principles of Ninth Circuit scienter
jurisprudence: (1) pleading scienter requires specific allegations of
fraud, and (2) specific allegations that corporate officers had reason to
know of the company’s fraudulent operations.199 By requiring securities
plaintiffs to make specific factual allegations regarding both the
substance of fraud and management’s knowledge of the fraud, the Ninth
Circuit effectively discourages the filing of frivolous lawsuits without
preventing meritorious claims from surviving a motion to dismiss.

193. Oracle maintained a debit account containing money that customers had
inadvertently overpaid to Oracle. On November 17, 2000, Oracle created more
than 46,000 invoices (“debit memos”) in an effort to “clean up” the account.
Plaintiffs allege that Oracle credited the amount of the debit memos as
revenue, thereby artificially inflating the amount of revenue reported on
December 14 at the end of the second quarter.
See id. at 1233.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1234.
196. See id. at 1231–34.
197. Id. at 1231–32.
198. See id. at 1234 (describing specific admissions by corporate officers that they
engage in “hands on” management, which suggest that said managers had knowledge of
fraudulent activity).
199. See id. (“It is reasonable to infer that the Oracle executives’ detail-oriented
management style led them to become aware of the allegedly improper revenue
recognition of such significant magnitude that the company would have missed its
quarterly earnings projection but for the adjustments.”).
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c. Advantages of the Ninth Circuit Rule
Adoption of the Ninth Circuit rule decreases the chances that plaintiffs
will be successful when pursuing fraud claims. Plaintiffs and plaintiffs’
attorneys will be less likely to bring securities suits if they contemplate
reduced chances of success. Reducing the number of securities fraud
claims pursued against issuers will cause an increase in the value of
securities. This increase will result from both issuers allocating fewer
resources to monitoring its agents, and issuers being subjected to fewer
lawsuits.
The prevailing standards have not effectively reduced the number
private fraud filings.200 The Stanford Law School Security Class Action
Clearinghouse noted this nonreduction as a pattern in the five years
following the passage of the PSLRA.201 The easiest way to bring about
a reduction in filings is to interpret the scienter standard as being more
conducive to granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment,
which is exactly what the Ninth Circuit standard achieves.
3. Tenth Circuit’s Middle Ground
The Tenth Circuit adopted a position in between the extremes that are
the Second and Ninth Circuits. The Tenth Circuit test instructs the court
to consider the “totality of the pleadings,” and considers motive and
opportunity to be indicative of scienter.202 The test requires that plaintiff’s
allegation in their entirety “give rise to a strong inference of scienter.”203
This approach has become increasingly popular and resembles the tests
used by the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits.204

200. See Stanford Law School, supra note 48 (noting that the number of suits filed
in the three years before the passage of the PSLRA, 1993–1995, averaged 194 per year).
In the four years after the passage of the bill, 1997–2000, the number rose to 207 per
year. Id. This second number would be substantially higher if it included the number of
suits filed in 2001, when the collapse of the internet boom in part contributed to the
filing of an astounding 493 suits. Id.
201. Id.
202. City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1262–63 (10th Cir.
2001); Hart, supra note 28, at 578 (referring to the Tenth Circuit’s position as aligning
itself with the “middle ground” circuits).
203. Fleming, 264 F.3d, at 1263.
204. Id. at 1261–62. “These circuits have determined that courts must look to the
totality of the pleadings . . . . Allegations of motive and opportunity may be important to
that totality, but are typically not sufficient in themselves to establish a ‘strong inference’
of scienter.” Id. at 1262. The Tenth Circuit went on to note that the Eleventh Circuit’s
standard was “arguably” in line with the position adopted by the Tenth Circuit. Id. at
1261.
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IV. NINTH CIRCUIT’S ARTICULATED STANDARD SHOULD
BE ADOPTED ON CERTIORARI
A. Second Circuit Standard is Not Consistent
with the Core Provisions
As established in section II.B, the core provisions of the PSLRA
discourage the filing of marginal securities suits by decreasing plaintiff’s
bargaining leverage. When combined with the Act’s legislative history,
the effect of the core provisions gives rise to a logical inference that the
purpose of the PSLRA was to advantage securities litigation defendants.
When interpreting the scienter requirement, courts should act consistently
with the Act’s overall purpose.
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of scienter prevents the PSLRA
from effectively furthering its goal of discouraging the filing of frivolous
lawsuits. By adopting ordinary recklessness as the requisite scienter
requirement, the Second Circuit undermined the PSLRA’s dominant
purpose. Where the core provisions of the Act work to the defendants’
advantage, the Second Circuit’s scienter requirement favors securities
litigation plaintiffs and contravenes the intent expressed in the Act’s
legislative history.
The degree of intent required to find liability for a given claim relates
directly to the parties’ bargaining positions. The basic standards of
culpability include, from easiest to most difficult to establish, the following
standards: negligent,205 reckless,206 intentional,207 and purposeful.208 A
defendant liable under a heightened standard of culpability will also be
liable under all lower standards. For example, a defendant acting purposely
is also, by definition, acting intentionally.
The imposition of recklessness, as opposed to a higher standard, as the
required state of mind to hold a defendant liable for securities fraud
violations increases plaintiff’s chances of success at trial. Any factor
205. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004) (“[F]ailure to exercise the
standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar
situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others
against unreasonable risk of harm . . . . culpable carelessness.”).
206. Id. at 1298 (“Conduct whereby the actor does not desire harmful consequence
but nonetheless foresees the possibility and consciously takes the risk.”).
207. Id. at 826 (“Done with the aim of carrying out the act.”).
208. Id. at 1272 (“Done with a specific purpose in mind . . . .”). Purpose is defined
in part as “[a]n objective, goal, or end.” Id. at 1271.
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that increases the chance that a party will succeed at trial increases that
party’s bargaining leverage. Thus, the Second Circuit scienter requirement
gives plaintiff more bargaining leverage than does the Ninth Circuit
scienter requirement. This interpretation conflicts with the effect of the
core provisions of PSLRA, which is to increase defendant’s bargaining
leverage.209
Several arguments support abandoning recklessness as the standard for
liability in favor of a higher standard. First, the Second Circuit holding that
the PSLRA did not modify the scienter requirement 210 ignores statements
of congressional intent.211 Second, the PSLRA, as currently interpreted,
has been largely ineffective in discouraging the filing of frivolous
lawsuits. Third, it can be inferred from the effect of the core provisions
of the PSLRA that the desired goal of the Act was to discourage
plaintiffs from filing frivolous suits by reducing their chances of
surviving a motion to dismiss.212
B. Ninth Circuit Standard is Consistent as Articulated, However its
Application is Questionable
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Silicon Graphics II 213 established
that the PSLRA’s scienter requirement could only be satisfied by
pleading deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct.214 The Silicon
Graphics courts expressly rejected motive and opportunity to commit
fraud as a means to establish the requisite scienter.215 This scienter
requirement was generally viewed as a substantial change from the level
of proof required before the PSLRA.216 This standard, if applied as
articulated, would be consistent with the effect of the core provisions of
the PSLRA. However, a recent trend suggests that the Ninth Circuit’s
209. See section II.B, supra (discussing the effect of the core provisions).
210. Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2001).
211. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 740 (“Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading
requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit’s case law interpreting this
pleading standard.”).
212. See King v. Livent, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re First
Union Corp. Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 638, 641 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
213. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999)
(requiring plaintiff to plead “in great detail, facts that constitute strong circumstantial
evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct.”).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Scott H. Moss, Comment, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: The
Scienter Debacle, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1279, 1318 (2000) (“In addition to forming a
new and uncertain standard of scienter under the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit established a
seemingly impossible barrier to private individuals bringing a securities fraud
claim . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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application of the rule established in Silicon Graphics I and II blurs the
differences between deliberate recklessness and ordinary recklessness.217
It has been argued that the Ninth Circuit has “retreated” from its once
“extreme interpretation” of the PSLRA and has applied a more relaxed
standard in recent cases.218 Charles F. Hart argues that the “deliberate
recklessness” standard, as applied by the Ninth Circuit, is “essentially
the same as the Sixth Circuit’s ‘akin to conscious disregard,’ which both
the First and Eleventh Circuits have adopted.”219 Mr. Hart bases this
argument on two Ninth Circuit cases, one of which directs district courts
to view complaints in their “entirety” and to consider an allegation
“together with any reasonable inferences.”220
In Gompper v. VISX, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance of
viewing a complaint in its entirety, including drawing all logical
inferences, in order to ensure that a heightened pleading standard is
applied.221 To do otherwise, and to accept “only inferences favorable to
[the plaintiff] would be to eviscerate the PSLRA’s strong inference
requirement by allowing plaintiffs to plead in a vacuum.”222 The Gompper
court expressly rejected plaintiff’s argument that the court must accept
any reasonable and warranted inference favorable to the plaintiff and
reject all other inferences.223 This approach, considering all possible
inferences, is consistent with the Ninth Circuit precedent, but creates the
possibility of a functional lowering of the articulated standard.224
217. See Hart, supra note 28, at 601 (“Interestingly, in both Lipton v. PathoGenesis
Corp., and in another Ninth Circuit case, Gompper v. VISX, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
appeared to downplay any differences between its interpretation of the PSLRA and that
of its sister circuits.”).
218. Id.
219. Id. Hart goes on to argue that the Tenth Circuit’s “extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care . . . known to the defendant” will usually lead to the same
result as the supposedly extreme Ninth Circuit test. Id.
220. Id. at 601 (citing Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2002)).
221. Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896.
222. Id.
223. Id. Plaintiff argued that the fact that defendant, VISX, vigorously litigated against
others, who VISX felt were infringing on their patent rights, gave rise to the inference that
VISX knew their patent was invalid and were attempting to protect their business through
intimidation. Id. at 896–97. The court then noted that they could not rightly exclude the
inference which cut against plaintiffs’ argument that VISX was litigating against potential
patent infringers because VISX believed the patent was valid. Id.
224. Id. at 897 (citing Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 996 (9th Cir.
1999)). Plaintiff argued that defendant knew it was not going to have strong sales based
on defendant’s knowledge that defendant was expecting a reduction in total shipment.
Id. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument because of the possibility of other inferences,
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A recent district court case applying the Ninth Circuit standard
illustrates the possibility that the lofty scienter requirement can be
applied in a lenient fashion through the adoption of permissive presumptions.
In Johnson v. Aljian (Aljian),225 the Central District of California adopted a
permissive presumption that a civil defendant who trades while in
possession of material nonpublic information (MNPI) is trading based on
the MNPI.226 The court instructed that this presumption is proper where
defendants’ trading in the security at issue was suspiciously inconsistent
with defendants’ prior trades.227 The court held that the circumstantial
evidence was sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of scienter.228
Allowing the permissive inference in Johnson to constitute sufficient
evidence of scienter conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent. An earlier
Ninth Circuit decision held that “[t]he existence of a ‘reasonable
inference’ . . . does not satisfy the PSLRA’s requirement that Plaintiffs
allege particular facts that give rise to a ‘strong inference’ of scienter.”229
Regardless of the reasonableness of the inference in Aljian, its certain
affect is to improve plaintiff’s chance of surviving a motion for
summary judgment. Liberal adoption of permissive presumptions based
on minimal hard evidence undermines the PSLRA’s goals and effectively
lowers the Ninth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard.
V. CONCLUSION: COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET THE SCIENTER
REQUIREMENT CONSISTENTLY WITH THE
CORE PROVISIONS
The PSLRA’s drafters wrote a piece of legislation whose clear goal
was to shift the advantage in private securities litigation from plaintiff to
defendant. This intent is evident in the probable effect of numerous
PSLRA provisions. This Comment cites several examples of how the
PSLRA reduces the plaintiff class’ bargaining leverage and decreases
the likelihood that the plaintiff class will reach a favorable settlement.
The goal of reducing bargaining leverage can also be gleaned from the
legislative history of the Act, including an admission that the existing
including that there might not be a correlation between shipments and sales. Id.
225. No. 03-5986 FMC (PJWx), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14986 (C.D. Cal. July 30,
2004).
226. Id. at 40 (“[A]lthough knowing possession of insider information is not a per
ser violation, when an insider trades while in possession of [NMPI], a strong inference
arises that such information was used in the insider trading.”) The same presumption
was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in a criminal case as it would force the accused to
prove her own innocence. Id. at 40-41.
227. Id. at 42.
228. Id. at 41.
229. In re Read-Rite Corp. Sec. Litig., 335 F.3d 843, 848–49 (9th Cir. 2003).
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law was not a sufficient means to limit the number of frivolous lawsuits
filed.
The PSLRA’s ambiguous and controversial scienter requirement is
inconsistent with the rest of the Act if read as reducing or maintaining
the pre-PSLRA scienter requirement. Only a reading which views the
PSLRA’s intent requirement as heightened beyond the pre-PSLRA
standards would be consistent with the balance of the provision in the
PSLRA. The United States Supreme Court should remedy the flawed
interpretation of the PSLRA by adopting the Ninth Circuit’s articulated
scienter requirement and clarifying that there is a substantive difference
between the adopted standard and that employed by the Second Circuit
and the “middle ground” circuits.
SHAUN MULREED
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